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ABSTRACT, KEYWORDS AND JEL CODES 
This dissertation analyses the banking supervision in the European Union and the 
possible conflict of interests between monetary policy and supervision due to the 
integration of banking supervision and regulation duties within the European Central 
Bank (ECB). The empirical section considers the topic on the supervision side, looking at 
the compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for effective supervision as a 
benchmark, trying to assess whether the banking supervision framework has significant 
impact on the best supervision practises. A sample of 22 countries and a cross-sectional 
analysis was considered. The results suggest that the supervisory structure has no 
significance on the compliance with the BCP. On the contrary, financial freedom is a 
significant variable.   
 
KEYWORDS: Banking Supervision; Basel Core Principles Compliance; Central Banking; 
Euro Area; European Central Bank; Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After the great financial crisis big changes happened in the banking policy and 
supervision within the European Monetary Union (De Rynck, 2014). A new paradigm 
came to life and Central Banks and supervisory authorities of the European Union (EU) 
members lost some of their powers to the European Central Bank (ECB). Following this 
new supervisory framework and with aim of further development of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), new mechanisms were created, namely the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, 2020). 
The implementation of the SSM happened in 2014 with the intention of concentrating 
under the ECB umbrella the European banking supervision system and pursue greater 
financial stability, soundness of banks and further banking integration, a mandate that 
the ECB did not have and that joins to the initial one: price stability and safeguarding the 
value of the euro (European Central Bank, 2020). 
This new approach is not unanimous and might bring to light some conflicts among these 
two mandates, being the most relevant one the possible conflict of interest between 
monetary policy and banking supervision, the main topic of this thesis. 
After comparing the pros and cons of integrating the banking supervision within the ECB 
and the concentration of both functions under the same roof, this dissertation aims to 
look at some empirical evidence that might give a different perspective on the 
significance that this new framework may have on the effectiveness and quality of 
banking supervision and regulation. 
To pursue the goal described above it was made the decision of looking at the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) as the main study object. The BCP were 
first issued in 1997 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), part of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and are used by countries as a benchmark to 
evaluate the quality of their  banking supervisory and regulatory systems, regardless 
each country supervisory structure (BIS, 2012). There are regular assessments of the 
supervisors’ compliance with this core principles by the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) through the Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
(FSAP) (BIS, 2012). 
Considering a sample of 22 countries that had their FSAP released in the last six years, a 
compliance index was estimated to assess which ones comply the most with the core 
principles. After that, the sample was divided between the ones with the banking 
supervisory mandate integrated within the Central Bank and the ones which have a 
supervision agency independent from the Central Bank. From that, the focus was to 
analyse and assess which type of framework comply the most with the supervisory good 
practises. 
Next, an econometric regression was performed to measure if the banking supervisory 
framework has any significance on the level of effectiveness and compliance of 
supervisors with the core principles for effective banking supervision. In other words, 
this econometric exercise tries to evaluate if the fact of the banking supervision being a 
mandate of the central bank, or not, has any impact on the compliance with the banking 
supervision best procedures. In this exercise the index of compliance with the BCP is the 
dependent variable and the key explanatory variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 
if the banking supervisor is part of the Central Bank and 0 if it is not. In addition, the 
model also includes several other independent variables, as possible explanations of 
quality and effectiveness of banking supervision. 
The dissertation follows the usual structure with the literature review, methods and 
data, the empirical analysis, and the conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature about the new Banking Supervision System, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and all the other transformations that occurred regarding the 
institutional mandates of monetary policy and banking supervision is scarce and often 
outdated. With some exceptions, it is very difficult to find research papers published 
after 2014 (year the SSM came into force) that accurately replicate the outcome of these 
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reforms and the consequences of the possible conflict of interests between monetary 
policy and supervision. 
After the great recession and sequent banking crisis, a new paradigm emerged and 
monetary and macroprudential policies started to be used for countercyclical 
management under the same roof (Smets, 2013). Monetary policy kept its focus on price 
stability, macroprudential policies took care of financial stability and microprudential 
policy concentrated on financial institutions (Smets, 2013). The same happened within 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) but under the European Central Bank (ECB) 
umbrella, through institutions like the SSM, created with the purpose of concentrating 
supervision within the ECB and composed by a Supervisory Board, and the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), responsible for macroprudential supervision and systemic 
risk. This integration brought back an old discussion about what the Central Bank 
responsibilities should be and if a conflict of interests might exist. 
One of the biggest arguments against the integration of the monetary policy and the 
banking supervision and regulation under the same roof, in this case the Central Bank, 
is the conflict mentioned above. According to Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) a good 
example to portrait this argument can be the willingness of the Central Bank’s monetary 
policy arm to increase interest rates to control inflation and the regulatory and 
supervision one to be against due to the undesirable effects it might have on the 
profitability and solvency of the banking system. The ultimate consequence of this 
situation could be a loose or more flexible monetary policy to avoid adverse effects on 
the soundness of banks (Barth et al., 2003; Beck and Gros, 2013). Furthermore, the 
Central Bank might get the idea that its main purpose is to protect banks and not the 
public interest (Haubrich, 1996) or even fall into the  risk of being captured by the 
supervised banks, part of a very well organized sector (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2016). 
Following the same line of thinking, Winecoff (2014) presents another example, stating 
that standard monetary policy is countercyclical, expanding or restricting the money 
supply according to the state of the economy and that the opposite happens with some 
prudential regulatory policies which are pro-cyclical, like the minimum capital adequacy 
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ratios, to enforce banking discipline. This situation might be an obstacle for policymakers 
to manage a shock in the economy because pro-cyclical measures tend to restrict the 
banking activity when it is most needed. 
But Hellwig (2014) looks at the conflict the other way around, considering an approach 
in which the monetary policy targets might dominate. Claiming that the Central Bank 
might use its microprudential supervisor mandate to pursue monetary policy purposes 
and impose measures on banks that might not be on the institutions’ best interest, 
making them take additional risks. 
In 2016, another step was taken towards a full banking union within the EMU with the 
creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which is today the central institution 
for bank resolution in the European Union and which is applied to banks under the SSM 
supervision (European Commission, 2020b). Before that, the support for the national 
banking systems was designed to come mostly from the domestic governments and 
central banks (Winecoff, 2014). Once more, this new mechanism is under the ECB rule, 
which places the lender of last resort and the supervisor under the same roof. 
Taking into account the facts described above, Masciandaro and Quintyn (2016) state 
that regulated institutions, knowing that their supervisor can bail them out, might fall 
into moral hazard through a higher propensity for risk-taking, something that could be 
avoided if the supervisor were different from the liquidity manager. Furthermore, an 
intervention is always something very costly and that can seriously tarnish the 
reputation of the supervisor, in this case responsible for the monetary policy too. This 
fact might produce forbearance and procrastination from the central bank’s supervision 
mechanism, to avoid the kind of problems described above (Hellwig, 2014). 
The loss of independence might be another conundrum. Beck and Gros (2012) and 
Lastra and Goodhart (2016) focus on this point due to the ECB growing responsibilities 
and power, which might make it more vulnerable to political pressures. Specifically, due 
to situations where the Central Bank can interfere in the functioning of the member 
states banking system, bank resolutions and capitalizations. Moreover, the fact that the 
representatives from national supervisory authorities (members of the Supervisory 
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Board of the SSM) might not be political independent or have the same level of 
independence as a Central Bank has might be judged as a problem. On the other hand, 
the opposite might happen, and the Central bank might become too powerful and with 
limited accountability to legislatures and governments.  
When the SSM was implemented there was a concern to ensure that there was going to 
exist a real separation between the monetary policy and the supervision duties. 
According to Beck and Gros (2012), the legislation is explicit and there should be a 
“Chinese wall” between both functions, the separation principle, but in reality it may 
not be quite like that. Within the SSM, the decision-making process is based on the 
Supervisory Board draft decisions, which are later applied by the ECB Governing Council 
“under the non-objection procedure” (Single Supervisory Mechanism, 2020). 
Furthermore, the Supervisory Council itself is composed by five ECB representatives and 
representatives of national supervisors, largely the same institutions which are also part 
of the Governing Council. 
Following the line of thinking of Lastra and Goodhart (2016), both duties should be seen 
as complementary and that is the real reason why they were moved under the ECB 
umbrella. One can even say that the separation principle itself goes against most of the 
advantages that the combination could create, such as access to more and better 
information, more capacity to handle moments of crisis, take benefit from the ECB 
independence, better resources allocation and access to a more “qualified staff” (Di 
Noia and Di Giorgio, 1999; Barth et al., 2003; Beck and Gros, 2013; Lima, 2017). 
Furthermore, it’s not unanimous which framework should be followed, combination or 
separation, and empirical studies on the subject are sometimes contradictory. Di Noia 
and Di Giorgio (1999) found out that the inflation rate is higher and more volatile in 
countries where the supervision is a task of the Central Bank. They also found, although 
with preliminary results, that countries with supervision within the Central Bank tend to 
have a more protected and less efficient banking system. On the contrary, Lazopoulos, 
Lima and Gabriel (2016) conclude that their empirical findings do not support the 
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banking supervisory framework of an economy has a statistically significant impact on 
inflation. 
Barth et al. (2003) took another approach and opted for doing a cross-country analysis 
of the banking supervisory framework and banks performance. Their results do not 
provide an outcome which allow them to say that a specific banking supervision 
structure has impact on banking performance, they point out that maybe the discussion 
should be focused on other aspects. On the other hand, the Winecoff (2014) results 
support the separation of supervisory tasks from the Central Bank, arguing that banks 
act less prudent when they expect favoured policies from the Central Bank, stating that 
capital adequacy ratios are higher when the supervision is not enforced by the Central 
bank. Barth et al. (2002) results on the impact of the banking supervision framework on 
bank safety and soundness also favour separation, stating that banks supervised by the 
Central Bank tend to have more non-performing loans. 
Looking now to a very specific research paper, focused on the American Federal Reserve 
(FED), Ioannidou (2005) conclusions on the possible effect of monetary policy on the 
central bank’s role as supervisor show that when the FED tightens its monetary policy it 
becomes less rigorous on supervision affairs. One reason for that might be a possible 
compensation from the Central Bank to the banking system for the extra effort it is 
demanding or even due to the need of stability in the financial system.  
Finally, there are several arguments for and against integration and, as Hellwig (2014) 
argues, supervision is an administrative activity, very different from monetary policy, 
which might raise questions about culture, procedure and even judicial doubts. But 
considering the difficult circumstances in which the integration of supervision under the 
ECB was done, and following Schnabel (2016), one can say that, at the time, the ECB was 
probably the only institution capable of acting. Beck and Gros (2012) corroborate with 
this view, and consider that the situation of crisis the European Union lived at the time, 
due to the excessive interdependence between the sovereign credit and banking 
systems (Véron, 2011), overcome most of the arguments against the supervision 
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integration and that only an independent institution as the ECB could be assigned with 
the job. 
 
3. METHODS AND DATA 
The Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) are the basis of the 
empirical section of this dissertation. Focusing on the banking supervision in the 
European Union and considering the work developed by Arnone and Gambini (2006), 
the compliance of the supervisors with the BCP was chosen as the way to assess if there 
is a possible impact on the quality and effectiveness of banking supervision due to its 
integration within the central bank. 
The BCP were first issued in 1997 by the BIS and today are an aggregation of 29 core 
principles for effective banking supervision1 seen as a fundamental tool to assess the 
quality of banking supervisory systems and to understand what should be improved by 
supervisors. The principles are divided in two sections: supervisory powers, 
responsibilities and functions; and prudential regulations and requirements (BIS, 2012).  
Following the Arnone and Gambini (2006) methodology, the index of BCP compliance 
was estimated based on the results of the most recent FSAP reports from the IMF and 
the WB, for each country. As the main idea is to capture the effectiveness of the SSM 
and similar supervision frameworks, the time considered was between 2014 (year the 
SSM came into force) and 2020. In this period, 22 countries were assessed once, 
although in different years, constituting our sample: Australia, The Bahamas, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Euro Area, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Moldova, New Zealand, Peru, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. In this exercise the euro area, which 
is the group of EU members that adopted the euro as their currency (European 
Commission, 2020a), will be treated as a country, being one of the 22 countries 
evaluated. Moreover, due to data limitations, all data concerning the independent 
 
1 See Table A. I in the appendix. 
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variables are relative to the year in which the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 was estimated for each country 
or the previous year or two. 
In the FSAP reports, all the 29 core principles were assessed and scored according to 
Table I. Using the values of each principle (each grade was given a value from 0 to 3), 
the results of each country were aggregated and normalized in order to estimate the 
dependent variable, an index of compliance with the core principles ranging from 0 to 
1, the variable 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥. 
TABLE I 
ASSESSMENT GRADES ON THE BASEL CORE 
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 
C – Compliant 3 
LC – Largely Compliant 2 
MNC – Materially Non-Compliant 1 
NC/NA – Non-Compliant/Not Applicable 0 
                             Source: BIS (2012) 
 
The calculation results of the index of compliance with the core principles are in Table 
II. 
TABLE II 
BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION INDEX BY COUNTRY 
(2014-2019) 
Australia (2019) (IMF, 2019a) 0.862 Korea (2014) (IMF and WB, 2014) 0.667 
The Bahamas (2019) (IMF, 2019b) 0.828 Moldova (2016) (IMF and WB, 2016a) 0.552 
Brazil (2018) (IMF and WB, 2018a) 0.828 New Zealand (2017) (IMF and WB, 2017a) 0.609 
Canada (2014) (IMF, 2014a) 0.920 Peru (2018) (IMF and WB, 2018c) 0.828 
China (2017) (IMF and WB, 2017b) 0.828 Russia (2016) (IMF and WB, 2016b) 0.690 
Denmark (2014) (IMF, 2014b) 0.747 South Africa (2015) (IMF, 2015a) 0.908 
Euro Area (2018) (IMF, 2018) 0.644 Switzerland (2014) (IMF, 2014d) 0.874 
Georgia (2015) (IMF and WB, 2015) 0.759 Thailand (2019) (IMF and WB, 2019) 0.943 
Hong Kong (2014) (IMF, 2014c) 0.966 Turkey (2017) (IMF and WB, 2016c) 0.782 
India (2018) (IMF and WB, 2018b) 0.782 United Kingdom (2016) (IMF, 2016) 0.897 
Japan (2017) (IMF, 2017) 0.805 United States of America (2015) (IMF, 2015b) 0.874 
 Source: FSAP reports and the author’s own calculations 
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Firstly, the 22 countries sample was divided according to its supervisory framework, the 
ones where the Central Bank is responsible for banking supervision (13) and the ones 
where it is not (9)2 (Table III). Further, a simple and descriptive analysis of some parts of 
the data was performed considering the two sub-samples, with a special focus on the 
𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 and its relationship with the different supervisory frameworks considered. A 
T-test comparing the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 means of the two sub-samples of countries was 
performed. 
TABLE III 




                            Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata 
 
Secondly, to capture the relationship between the supervisory framework and the 
compliance with the BCP, a cross-sectional analysis was performed, carrying out an OLS 
regression with robust standard errors. For a better and more effective comparison and 
analysis, all the nine independent variables are standardized, as most variables are 
presented in different scales. The standardized coefficients make the scale of the 
regressors irrelevant and put the variables “on equal footing” (Wooldridge, 2012).   
The econometric model is: 
 
(1) 
𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑐𝑏𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚
+ 𝛽 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑃 + 𝑢 
 
 
2 See Table A. II in the appendix. 
      Total           22      100.00
                                                
         CB           13       59.09      100.00
     Non-CB            9       40.91       40.91
                                                
Supervision        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
    Banking  
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𝒃𝒄𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 Normalized index of compliance with the BCP 
Independent Expected Impact 
𝒄𝒃𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 =1 if the central bank is responsible for banking 
supervision, 0 if not 
+/- 
𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕 =1 if exists a deposit guarantee scheme, 0 otherwise + 
𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 =1 if the bank supervisor is specialized in banking 
supervision alone, 0 otherwise 
+/- 
𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 Inflation, 3 years average measured by annual growth 
rate of the GDP implicit deflator in percentage  
- 
𝒇𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒂𝒍 General government fiscal balance in GDP percentage  + 
𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by deposit 
money banks as a share of GDP  
+ 
𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒐𝒎 Freedom in The World Index  + 
𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒐𝒎 Financial Freedom Index  + 
𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒅𝒆𝒗 Institutional Development Indicator  + 
𝑭𝑺𝑨𝑷 Number of years since the first FSAP assessment +/- 
 
Concerning the independent variables, the 𝑐𝑏𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 explanatory variable is a 
dummy that takes the value 0 if the Central Bank is not the Banking Supervisor and the 
value 1 if the Central Bank is responsible for banking supervision or has a considerable 
role. 
Other two dummy variables were defined. One takes the value 0 if a country does not 
have a system of deposit insurance and the value 1 if it does (𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡). This variable has 
the aim of capture one of the preconditions for effective banking supervision from the 
BIS (2012), an appropriate level of systemic protection. The other dummy takes the 
value 0 if the banking supervisor is not specialized in banking supervision alone and the 
value 1 if it is (𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛). 
Following another precondition for effective banking supervision from the BIS (2012), 
sound and sustainable macro policies, two other control variables were defined. One of 
them is the 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 measured by the average annual growth rate of the GDP implicit 
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deflator (in percentage) in the three years prior to the most recent FSAP report from 
each country, data from the  World Bank (2020). The other one is 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙, which 
represents the fiscal balance of governments in the year the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 was estimated 
or, due to data limitations, in the previous year or two, using data from IMF (2020). 
Considering Arnone and Gambini (2006) and previous research from one of the authors, 
which already confirmed that the development of the banking sector has a positive 
effect on the compliance with the BCP, it was included a variable to control the banking 
sector size effects, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒. This variable considers the claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP (Beck et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, two control variables considering freedom were defined. One of them 
reflects general freedom through an index ranging from 0 to 2 (0 – not free, 1 – partly 
free and 2 – free) which considers political rights and civil liberties, 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 (Freedom 
House, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). The second one captures financial freedom through an 
index ranging from 0 to 100 which reflects bank efficiency and the level of independence 
of the financial sector from governments, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 (Miller et al., 2014, 2015, 
2016, 2017) 
Moreover, a variable based on Doumpos, Gaganis and Pasiouras (2015) was constructed 
to capture the institutional development of each country (𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣). This indicator was 
calculated as the average of six governance indicators ranging from -2.5 and 2.5 assessed 
by the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 (Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi, 2010; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2019). Finally, there is one variable which 
reflects the number of years past since the first FSAP report released for each country 
(𝐹𝑆𝐴). 
Table V displays the descriptive statistics concerning the dataset3 created for the 
empirical analysis, where the number of observations is higher than the number of 
variables, following the guidelines of Hair et al.(2013). 
 
 
3 See Table A. III and Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the appendix.  
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       Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata. 
 
4. ANALISYS 
Following the literature review and all the pros, cons and different outcomes of research 
papers and publications about the different banking supervisory frameworks, it became 
clear that there is not an optimal way of assessing which one is more effective or 
compliant with the best practises of supervision. Considering the topic of this 
dissertation, it was decided to approach the possible conflict of interest between central 
banking and supervision from the side of supervision. As mentioned in the previous 
section, it was calculated an index, based on the methodology of Arnone and Gambini 
(2006), to assess the level of compliance of the 22 countries of the sample, with the core 
principles for effective supervision. The 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 values are shown in Table II and the 
frequency of each supervisory framework across the sample in Table III. 
The analysis of Tables II and III allow us to conclude that almost all countries have high 
values, since the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ranges from 0 to 1, and that roughly 60% of the sample have 
their Central Bank responsible for banking supervision.  
        FSAP           22    8.045455    4.664734          0         14
                                                                       
     instdev           22    .6627312     .886687  -.7175956   1.860599
finanfreedom           22    64.35407    18.91893         20         90
     freedom           22    1.545455    .7385489          0          2
    banksize           22    113.6113    56.61597   32.55642   257.2248
      fiscal           22   -2.240909    2.742203       -7.9        3.6
                                                                       
   inflation           22    3.000735    2.390453  -.2580435   8.961636
specializa~n           22    .3181818    .4767313          0          1
     deposit           22    .8636364    .3512501          0          1
cbsupervis~n           22    .5909091    .5032363          0          1
    bcpindex           22    .8103123    .1183259   .5517241    .999284
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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One can notice that there are five countries whose index values are below 0.7, the worst 
scores from all sample. All these five countries but one, The Republic of Korea, have their 
Central Bank as the entity responsible for banking supervision. The Euro Area is one of 
these 5 countries of the sample. 
Considering the 22 observations, the mean of the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is 0.81 with a standard 
deviation of about 0.12.  
Looking at Table VI, it is possible to demonstrate that the mean of the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is very 
similar whether the Central Bank acts as a supervisor or not. The sub-sample which 
represents the countries where banks are supervised by the Central Bank has a mean of 
0.809, the one where the opposite happens the mean is 0.812. One can say that both 
values are almost the same, but looking at the standard deviation of each sub-sample it 
is possible to confirm that it has almost twice the value when banking supervision is 
performed by the Central Bank (CB sample). 
TABLE VI 
TWO SAMPLE T-TEST FOR THE BCP INDEX 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata. 
 
Table VI presents the two-sample t-test confirming in a more accurately way the point 
discussed above. Looking at the null hypothesis on the table, which is the two means 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5247         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9506          Pr(T > t) = 0.4753
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       20
    diff = mean(Non-CB) - mean(CB)                                t =   0.0627
                                                                              
    diff               .003297    .0525715               -.1063651    .1129592
                                                                              
combined        22    .8103123    .0252272    .1183259    .7578495     .862775
                                                                              
      CB        13    .8089635    .0399766    .1441376     .721862     .896065
  Non-CB         9    .8122605    .0249042    .0747126    .7548313    .8696898
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
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being equal or the difference between them being zero, it is possible to verify that there 
is statistical evidence that the considered means are different at a confidence level of 
95%. At this point there is a small difference on the level of compliance of each sub 
sample, favouring the framework in which the Central Bank does not have supervisory 
powers, but that does not allow us to look at this test as conclusive enough. 
To pursue a more concluding output on the impact and significance of the supervisory 
frameworks in the compliance with the BCP, the second part of this empirical analysis 
consists of a cross-sectional study, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 
robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, and the key 
explanatory variable is the 𝑐𝑏𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 besides other 9 independent variables (as 
presented in Table IV). 
TABLE VII 
OLS RESULTS WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERROS. STANDARDIZED INDEPENDENT 




Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata 
                                                                                
         _cons     .8103123   .0228273    35.50   0.000     .7600697    .8605549
          FSAP    -.0137563   .0305371    -0.45   0.661     -.080968    .0534554
       instdev     .0432592   .0811226     0.53   0.604    -.1352904    .2218088
  finanfreedom     .1618975   .0646764     2.50   0.029     .0195456    .3042494
       freedom    -.1434429   .0577226    -2.49   0.030    -.2704895   -.0163964
      banksize     .0140384   .0405966     0.35   0.736     -.075314    .1033909
        fiscal    -.1714396   .0675962    -2.54   0.028    -.3202178   -.0226614
     inflation    -.0160584   .0359428    -0.45   0.664     -.095168    .0630512
specialization     .0267096   .0331061     0.81   0.437    -.0461564    .0995755
       deposit     .0034502   .0347143     0.10   0.923    -.0729555    .0798558
 cbsupervision    -.0304127   .0356017    -0.85   0.411    -.1087714    .0479461
                                                                                
      bcpindex        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               Robust
                                                                                
                                                Root MSE          =     .10707
                                                R-squared         =     0.5711
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0969
                                                F(10, 11)         =       2.27
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         22
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Table VII displays the results of the regression. Not all the independent variables had the 
expected impact4, although five of them confirmed the expected effect on the 
dependent variable:𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣. 
Another outcome is that half of the variables revealed to have a negative impact on the 
𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, being 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 the 
exceptions. This fact supports the idea that to strength the compliance of the supervisor, 
factors such as a system of deposit insurance, the supervisor being specialized in the 
banking sector alone, the development and size of the banking sector, the freedom lived 
in the financial sector or the development of institutions and governance  are important.  
From all the independent variables, there are three significant at a 95% level of 
confidence, being 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 and 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 two of them. These two variables present 
negative coefficients, meaning that both have a negative impact on the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥. 
Regarding the 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 variable, it was not expected that a healthy fiscal situation with 
positive fiscal balances would have a negative impact on the dependent variable. 
Likewise, the anticipated effect of 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 was positive. Indeed, it was not anticipated 
that political rights and civil liberties could have an adverse effect on the compliance 
with the core principles for effective banking supervision. So, maybe the model needs 
to be refined. 
Concerning the𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 variable, this first estimation confirms that high 
efficiency and independence from government in the banking sector has a positive 
impact and significance in the compliance with the best practises in banking supervision.  
The key explanatory variable has no significance at all, with a high p-value. In case of 
significance, one could say, due to its negative coefficient, that the Central Bank being 
responsible for banking supervision deteriorates the level of compliance with the BCP. 
The interpretation of a regression results must take in consideration the correlation 
among the independent variables. The simplest way to assess it is through a correlation 
matrix, since high correlations are the first signal of collinearity (Hair et al., 2013). High 
 
4 See Table III. 
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correlation between these variables is called multicollinearity and one solution for this 
possible problem might be dropping independent variables (Wooldridge, 2012).  
Multicollinearity might produce several impacts on the estimation, as affecting the 
predictive ability of the regression model and the estimation of the regression 
coefficients and statistical significance tests. Other impacts might be the difficulty to 
understand the real effects of each independent variable  (Hair et al., 2013). 





Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata. 
 
Looking at the correlation matrix above, it is possible to notice that the correlation 
coefficient of the variables 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 and 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 is negative and the only ones going 
against the initially expected impact5. It was not foreseen that positive fiscal balances, 
 
5 See Table III. 
        FSAP    -0.2702   0.0914   0.1034   1.0000
     instdev     0.6036   0.8319   1.0000
finanfreedom     0.5574   1.0000
     freedom     1.0000
                                                  
                freedom finanf~m  instdev     FSAP
        FSAP     0.0507   0.0489   0.1493  -0.2638   0.0564   0.1878   0.2031
     instdev     0.1314  -0.2141  -0.1775  -0.2265  -0.7113   0.5467   0.5748
finanfreedom     0.1739  -0.2041  -0.0912  -0.1304  -0.4555   0.6552   0.4635
     freedom    -0.0624  -0.1398  -0.2503  -0.1107  -0.3168  -0.0637  -0.0316
    banksize     0.2160  -0.2954   0.0447  -0.1112  -0.5273   0.6111   1.0000
      fiscal    -0.1099  -0.2715  -0.1099  -0.0114  -0.3734   1.0000
   inflation    -0.2038   0.2960  -0.0104   0.1582   1.0000
specializa~n    -0.0435   0.5684  -0.2973   1.0000
     deposit     0.3094  -0.3306   1.0000
cbsupervis~n    -0.0140   1.0000
    bcpindex     1.0000
                                                                             
               bcpindex cbsupe~n  deposit specia~n inflat~n   fiscal banksize
(obs=22)
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political rights and civil liberties would have an adverse effect on the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, it exists reasonable correlation between some of the 
independent variables but some values stand out, the correlation coefficients between 
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑖𝑠𝑛𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣, for example. One can verify that the variable 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 also presents several high coefficients.  
A measure of multicollinearity is the variance inflation factor (VIF), which directly 
expresses the degree of multicollinearity into an impact on the estimation process. It is 
in the hands of researchers to determine an acceptable degree of collinearity because 
most defaults or recommended thresholds still allow for substantial collinearity (Hair et 
al., 2013). 
TABLE IX 
VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR 
 
 
                                         Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata. 
 
Table IX confirms the doubt that arise from the correlation matrix and one can see that 
the variables 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚, 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 present the highest VIF 
values, which leads to the decision of dropping the 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 variables, 
ceteris paribus.  
The new econometric model is: 
 
    Mean VIF        4.54
                                    
        FSAP        1.55    0.646799
     deposit        1.70    0.588703
specializa~n        2.26    0.442831
    banksize        2.61    0.383665
cbsupervis~n        2.80    0.356550
   inflation        2.97    0.336318
      fiscal        5.81    0.172190
     freedom        6.61    0.151307
finanfreedom        7.36    0.135920
     instdev       11.73    0.085259
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF 
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𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑐𝑏𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚
+ 𝛽 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑃 + 𝑢 
 
Table IX presents the output of a second OLS regression with robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable remains the 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, the same happens with the key 
explanatory variable, the 𝑐𝑏𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, but in total there are only 8 independent 
variables, since two variables were dropped due to multicollinearity. The new 
correlation matrix and VIF calculations can be found in the appendix6. 
TABLE X 
OLS RESULTS WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERROS. STANDARDIZED INDEPENDENT 





Considering the new estimation results in Table X, one can verify that all variables had 
the expected impact7 except 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙, which kept the negative coefficient. Considering 
 
6 See tables A. IV and A. V in the appendix. 
7 See Table III. 
                                                                                
         _cons     .8103123    .026445    30.64   0.000     .7531813    .8674433
          FSAP     .0037533   .0300998     0.12   0.903    -.0612733    .0687798
  finanfreedom     .0472641   .0248087     1.91   0.079    -.0063319      .10086
      banksize     .0403928   .0418051     0.97   0.352    -.0499216    .1307072
        fiscal    -.0662963   .0447759    -1.48   0.163    -.1630288    .0304362
     inflation    -.0109587   .0278646    -0.39   0.700    -.0711564    .0492391
specialization     .0130684   .0379216     0.34   0.736    -.0688562     .094993
       deposit     .0384302   .0360887     1.06   0.306    -.0395347    .1163951
 cbsupervision     .0102591    .033581     0.31   0.765    -.0622881    .0828064
                                                                                
      bcpindex        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               Robust
                                                                                
                                                Root MSE          =     .12404
                                                R-squared         =     0.3197
                                                Prob > F          =     0.2328
                                                F(8, 13)          =       1.55
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         22
Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata. 
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the estimations from Arnone and Gambini (2006), one can verify that the variable 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 also presents a negative coefficient, as expected by the authors, and the same 
happens with 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, what differs from this exercise. On the other hand, 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 
has a positive coefficient. 
Comparing the outcome of this model with the previous one, an important difference 
stands out, the key explanatory variable has now a positive coefficient. On the one hand, 
it would mean that the Central Bank being responsible for banking supervision has a 
positive impact in the compliance with the BCP, but on the other hand, again, it has no 
statistical significance. 
The 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 variable kept its positive coefficient and reinforces the analysis 
based on the outcome of the first estimation. It kept its significance, but now at a level 
of confidence of 90%. 
Another change is that the variable 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 lost its significance but keeping its negative 
coefficient. So, further research is needed.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The literature review suggests that conflicts between monetary policy, one of the main 
tasks of the ECB, and supervision might arise when both functions are under the same 
roof, but it also shows that it is possible to take advantages of concentration. There is 
no unanimous process to assess if these conflicts have any significant impact on the level 
of effectiveness and compliance of supervisors. In addition, there is no conclusion on 
which supervisory framework is the more effective to conduct the monetary, the 
supervisory, and the regulatory duties. 
The empirical section of this dissertation approached the issue on the supervision side 
and tried to assess which supervisory framework complies the most with core principles 
for effective supervision and if the framework itself has any significance in the 
compliance levels.  
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On the one hand, there was an attempt of using the most recent data available and the 
Euro Area was treated as a country, creating the possibility of being compared to other 
jurisdictions. On the other hand, due to the lack of FSAP reports published during the 
analysed period, the number of countries was limited to 22. There were also several 
limitations to access to update data and, in the end, the low 𝑅 − 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 showed that 
some of the independent variables may not fit this exercise.  
Moreover, part of the outcome was not expected, specifically the negative impact of the 
variable 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙, which captures the general governments fiscal balance, on the 
compliance with the BCP. Further research is needed but one can suggest that this result 
happens due to some of the data limitations. 
One important conclusion is the significance of the 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 variable, which 
determines that high efficiency and independence from government in the banking 
sector have a positive impact and significance in the compliance with the BCP. 
Furthermore, the key explanatory variable has a positive coefficient, which means that 
the Central Bank being responsible for banking supervision would have positive impact 
in the compliance with the BCP if it had statistical significance. The results show that the 
supervisory framework seems not to have any impact on the compliance from the 
supervisor, unlike financial freedom. 
In conclusion, one can say that this exercise is a first attempt to empirically address the 
role of the supervisory framework and it does not allow us to assess which one may be 
the optimal, since the supervisory structure does not have statistical significance. 
For future research, the same empirical exercise should be performed but with a higher 
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TABLE A. I 
THE BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 




An effective system of banking supervision has clear responsibilities and 
objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks and banking 
groups. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is in place to 
provide each responsible authority with the necessary legal powers to 
authorise banks, conduct ongoing supervision, address compliance with laws 







The supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes, 
sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy and 
adequate resources and is accountable for the discharge of its duties and use 
of its resources. The legal framework for banking supervision includes legal 




Laws, regulations or other arrangements provide a framework for cooperation 
and collaboration with relevant domestic authorities and foreign supervisors. 
These arrangements reflect the need to protect confidential information. 
4 Permissible 
activities 
The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to 
supervision as banks are clearly defined and the use of the word “bank” in 
names is controlled. 
5 Licensing 
criteria 
The licensing authority has the power to set criteria and reject applications for 
establishments that do not meet the criteria. At a minimum, the licensing 
process consists of an assessment of the ownership structure and governance 
(including the fitness and propriety of Board members and senior 
management) of the bank and its wider group, and its strategic and operating 
plan, internal controls, risk management and projected financial condition 
(including capital base). Where the proposed owner or parent organisation is 
a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home supervisor is obtained. 
6 Transfer of 
significant 
ownership 
The supervisor has the power to review, reject and impose prudential 
conditions on any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling 
interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties. 
7 Major 
acquisitions 
The supervisor has the power to approve or reject (or recommend to the 
responsible authority the approval or rejection of), and impose prudential 
conditions on, major acquisitions or investments by a bank, against prescribed 
criteria, including the establishment of cross-border operations, and to 
determine that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to 
undue risks or hinder effective supervision. 
8 Supervisory 
approach 
An effective system of banking supervision requires the supervisor to develop 
and maintain a forward-looking assessment of the risk profile of individual 
banks and banking groups, proportionate to their systemic importance; 
identify, assess and address risks emanating from banks and the banking 
system as a whole; have a framework in place for early intervention; and have 
plans in place, in partnership with other relevant authorities, to take action to 




The supervisor uses an appropriate range of techniques and tools to 
implement the supervisory approach and deploys supervisory resources on a 
proportionate basis, taking into account the risk profile and systemic 
importance of banks. 
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The supervisor collects, reviews and analyses prudential reports and statistical 
returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and independently 
verifies these reports through either on-site examinations or use of external 
experts. 




The supervisor acts at an early stage to address unsafe and unsound practices 
or activities that could pose risks to banks or to the banking system. The 
supervisor has at its disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring 
about timely corrective actions. This includes the ability to revoke the banking 
licence or to recommend its revocation. 
12 Consolidated 
supervision 
An essential element of banking supervision is that the supervisor supervises 
the banking group on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as 
appropriate, applying prudential standards to all aspects of the business 
conducted by the banking group worldwide. 
13 Home-host 
relationships 
Home and host supervisors of cross-border banking groups share information 
and cooperate for effective supervision of the group and group entities, and 
effective handling of crisis situations. Supervisors require the local operations 
of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as those required of 
domestic banks. 
Prudential regulations and requirements 
14 Corporate 
governance 
The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups have robust 
corporate governance policies and processes covering, for example, strategic 
direction, group and organisational structure, control environment, 
responsibilities of the banks’ Boards and senior management, and 
compensation. These policies and processes are commensurate with the risk 




The supervisor determines that banks have a comprehensive risk management 
process (including effective Board and senior management oversight) to 
identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate all 
material risks on a timely basis and to assess the adequacy of their capital and 
liquidity in relation to their risk profile and market and macroeconomic 
conditions. This extends to development and review of contingency 
arrangements (including robust and credible recovery plans where warranted) 
that take into account the specific circumstances of the bank. The risk 
management process is commensurate with the risk profile and systemic 
importance of the bank. 
16 Capital 
adequacy 
The supervisor sets prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements 
for banks that reflect the risks undertaken by, and presented by, a bank in the 
context of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which it operates. 
The supervisor defines the components of capital, bearing in mind their ability 
to absorb losses. At least for internationally active banks, capital requirements 
are not less than the applicable Basel standards. 
17 Credit risk The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate credit risk 
management process that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile 
and market and macroeconomic conditions. This includes prudent policies and 
processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or 
mitigate credit risk (including counterparty credit risk) on a timely basis. The 
full credit lifecycle is covered including credit underwriting, credit evaluation, 
and the ongoing management of the bank’s loan and investment portfolios. 
18 Problem assets, 
provisions and 
reserves 
The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes 
for the early identification and management of problem assets, and the 
maintenance of adequate provisions and reserves. 
19 Concentration 
risk and large 
exposure limits 
The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes 
to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate 
concentrations of risk on a timely basis. Supervisors set prudential limits to 
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In order to prevent abuses arising in transactions with related parties and to 
address the risk of conflict of interest, the supervisor requires banks to enter 
into any transactions with related parties on an arm’s length basis; to monitor 
these transactions; to take appropriate steps to control or mitigate the risks; 
and to write off exposures to related parties in accordance with standard 
policies and processes. 
21 Country and 
transfer risks 
The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes 
to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate country 
risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities on 
a timely basis. 
22 Market risks The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate market risk 
management process that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile, 
and market and macroeconomic conditions and the risk of a significant 
deterioration in market liquidity. This includes prudent policies and processes 
to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate market 
risks on a timely basis. 
23 Interest rate 
risk in the 
banking book 
The supervisor determines that banks have adequate systems to identify, 
measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate interest rate risk in 
the banking book on a timely basis. These systems take into account the bank’s 
risk appetite, risk profile and market and macroeconomic conditions. 
24 Liquidity risk The supervisor sets prudent and appropriate liquidity requirements (which can 
include either quantitative or qualitative requirements or both) for banks that 
reflect the liquidity needs of the bank. The supervisor determines that banks 
have a strategy that enables prudent management of liquidity risk and 
compliance with liquidity requirements. The strategy takes into account the 
bank’s risk profile as well as market and macroeconomic conditions and 
includes prudent policies and processes, consistent with the bank’s risk 
appetite, to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or 
mitigate liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons. At least for 
internationally active banks, liquidity requirements are not lower than the 
applicable Basel standards. 
25 Operational risk The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate operational risk 
management framework that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile 
and market and macroeconomic conditions. This includes prudent policies and 
processes to identify, assess, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate 
operational risk on a timely basis. 
26 Internal control 
and audit 
The supervisor determines that banks have adequate internal control 
frameworks to establish and maintain a properly controlled operating 
environment for the conduct of their business taking into account their risk 
profile. These include clear arrangements for delegating authority and 
responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, 
paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; 
reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the bank’s assets; and 
appropriate independent internal audit and compliance functions to test 




The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups maintain adequate 
and reliable records, prepare financial statements in accordance with 
accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally and 
annually publish information that fairly reflects their financial condition and 
performance and bears an independent external auditor’s opinion. The 
supervisor also determines that banks and parent companies of banking 
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groups have adequate governance and oversight of the external audit 
function. 
28 Disclosure and 
transparency 
The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups regularly publish 
information on a consolidated and, where appropriate, solo basis that is easily 
accessible and fairly reflects their financial condition, performance, risk 
exposures, risk management strategies and corporate governance policies and 
processes. 
29 Abuse of 
financial 
services 
The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes, 
including strict customer due diligence rules to promote high ethical and 
professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being 
used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities. 
  Source: BIS (2012) 
 
 
TABLE A. II 
BANKING SUPERVISOR BY COUNTRY 
Australia Non-CB Korea Non-CB 
The Bahamas CB Moldova CB 
Brazil CB New Zealand CB 
Canada Non-CB Peru Non-CB 
China Non-CB Russia CB 
Denmark Non-CB South Africa CB 
Euro Area CB Switzerland Non-CB 
Georgia CB Thailand CB 
Hong Kong CB Turkey Non-CB 
India CB United Kingdom CB 
Japan Non-CB United States of America CB 
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ue to data lim
itations, the data used to create the independent variables are based on the year 2017. 
** Proxy value, due to data lim
itations, estim
ated based on the average of the deposit m
oney bank assets as a percentage of G
D
P of the m
em




any, Italy, Japan, the U
nited Kingdom
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Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata. 
 
 
TABLE A. V 




                                        Source: Author’s own calculations with Stata.  
 
 
        FSAP     0.0914   1.0000
finanfreedom     1.0000
                                
               finanf~m     FSAP
        FSAP     0.0507   0.0489   0.1493  -0.2638   0.0564   0.1878   0.2031
finanfreedom     0.1739  -0.2041  -0.0912  -0.1304  -0.4555   0.6552   0.4635
    banksize     0.2160  -0.2954   0.0447  -0.1112  -0.5273   0.6111   1.0000
      fiscal    -0.1099  -0.2715  -0.1099  -0.0114  -0.3734   1.0000
   inflation    -0.2038   0.2960  -0.0104   0.1582   1.0000
specializa~n    -0.0435   0.5684  -0.2973   1.0000
     deposit     0.3094  -0.3306   1.0000
cbsupervis~n    -0.0140   1.0000
    bcpindex     1.0000
                                                                             
               bcpindex cbsupe~n  deposit specia~n inflat~n   fiscal banksize
(obs=22)
    Mean VIF        1.87
                                    
     deposit        1.25    0.797458
        FSAP        1.40    0.713420
   inflation        1.62    0.617692
specializa~n        1.93    0.518323
finanfreedom        2.00    0.499603
    banksize        2.02    0.494035
cbsupervis~n        2.13    0.469254
      fiscal        2.59    0.386039
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF 
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FIGURE 1 – Inflation, 3 years average measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP 
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FIGURE 6 – Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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